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Abstract
This paper presents a simple evolutionary model to study the diﬀusion patterns
of product innovations for consumer goods. Following a Veblenian theme, we inter-
pret consumption as a social activity constrained by social norms and equality of
opportunity. Societies that allow for more behavioral variety will experience faster
adoption of new consumer goods. We also ﬁnd that the speed of diﬀusion as well as
the saturation levels reached highly depend on the equality of opportunity. Com-
bining these two eﬀects, we conclude that a social structure displaying behavioral
variety and equal opportunities dominates any other social set-up in terms of the
speed of adoption of product innovations.
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11 Introduction
Early economists and contemporary economic historians alike have identi-
ﬁed conspicuous consumption as an important determinant in the expansion
of markets and technological innovations in the Western world in the 18th
century and later. The acquisition and diﬀusion of consumer goods is driven
by “the recognition and admiration of our fellow human beings”, as “to de-
serve, to acquire, and to enjoy, the respect and admiration of mankind, are
the great objects of ambition and emulation”, (A.Smith, cited in Rosen-
berg [26, p.365]). This was particularly the case for semi-durable consumer
goods, such as ornaments of building, dress, or household furniture, (see e.g.
McKendrick et al. [21], Bianchi [3, p.6]). There is interdependence in the
choices of the diﬀerent populations of adopters. Members of diﬀerent so-
cial groups observe the consumption patterns of other members in society.
In the absence of more direct social contact consumption patterns reveal
the social status of people. This is a process in which consumers compare,
evaluate and imitate or reject the choices of relevant others. Furthermore,
socio-economic attributes such as disposable income or more pervasive value
systems have an inﬂuence on the choice and the subsequent legitimization of
an innovation in consumer goods. The diﬀusion of consumer good innova-
tion does not just involve the dissemination of information as the diﬀusion
literature typically would suggest (for an overview see Geroski [16]), but is
determined by a social process of persuasion and depends on the extent of
consumer heterogeneity in an economy.
Over the years the interest in the study of consumer behavior under the
presence of externalities amongst consumers has steadily increased. Many
contributions have drawn on ideas set out in the classic works of John Rae
[24] and Thorstein Veblen [35] on conspicuous consumption as well as on
ideas by sociologists such as Georg Simmel [31] or Pierre Bourdieu [4]. Most
of this literature has addressed the allocational aspect of interdependent
preferences and studied the adoption of pure luxury goods, such as ﬁne art,
holiday resorts, luxury cars or fashion goods (see e.g. Pesendorfer [22] or
Swann [32]), but was not so much interested in the diﬀusion of positional
goods.
The paper studies the diﬀusion paths resulting under diﬀerent parameter
settings capturing the social structure of an economy in a simple evolution-
ary model. By social structure we mean equality of opportunity and social
norms determining group cohesiveness. The ﬁrst is an indicator for the class
structure and reﬂects the probability of an individual of being member of any
of the two classes, and the second is a measure for freedom of choice. These
two parameters constrain consumer behavior and hence aﬀect the diﬀusion
patterns of new semi-durable consumer goods. We model two populations
of agents that diﬀer in their income, in their behavior towards their peers
and in their social position. Agents in the leading high income group seek
1distinction from members of the lower social class and draw well-being from
the fact to be similar or dissimilar to their peers. The extent to which be-
havioral variety within a social group exists is determined by social norms,
which may be thought of as social mechanisms sanctioning deviations from
group behavior. The lower class in turn behaves diﬀerently. As in the upper
class, there is a behavioral pattern which supports the cohesion of the group.
People draw utility from either conformist or snobbish behavior. But unlike
members of the upper class lower class types aspire to the lifestyle of people
in the upper class. They want to conform with the social elite. This is a typ-
ical setting of conspicuous consumption. The leading class shows the way,
while the lower class follows. Depending on the social norms and equality
of opportunity in society, very diﬀerent diﬀusion patterns result, which we
characterize in terms of market penetration time and speed of substitution.
In the next section we review relevant literature and give an overview
on the framework guiding our formal analysis. We then advance the evolu-
tionary model to study the diﬀusion patterns resulting from diﬀerent social
settings. In the fourth section we discuss our results and relate them to the
history of consumerism. Final comments conclude our paper.
2 Background
2.1 Previous work
The classical contributions of Duesenberry [11], Leibenstein [20] or Venieris
and Hayakawa [17] have tried to endogenize preferences through introduc-
tion of social or cultural propensities into the consumer’s choice problem
or the incorporation of Veblenian topics into utility functions. The work of
these authors implies that preferences for conspicuous or status goods are
driven by comparison of individuals with social reference groups. People may
react positively to the consumption pattern of some groups and adversely
to others. Accordingly, wants are shown not to be randomly distributed
throughout the society, but to cluster for speciﬁc social groups.
On this Veblenian line of thought several authors have developed status
game models to study the property of demand schedules under conspicuous
consumption and implications for taxation (see Corneo and Jeanne [7], [8]),
as well as possible market failure resulting from it and conditions under
which it can be avoided (see Pesendorfer [22] and Bagwell and Bernheim [2]).
The diﬀusion of new products is not an explicit aim of the analysis of these
papers.
Other work has partly addressed this question. Some authors have shown
that if the behavioral patterns of an individual are alternatingly enforced or
dampened by the behavior of signiﬁcant others chaotic demand patterns may
emerge (see for instance Congleton [6], Iannaccone [18] or Rauscher [25]).
Similarly Cowan, Cowan and Swann [9] have devised a stochastic model
2whose dynamic is based on aspiration-, bandwagon- and Veblen eﬀects.
They show that if certain consumer groups seek distinction and others aspire
to their behavior cyclical consumption patterns and consumption waves may
emerge. In a similar fashion Janssen and Jager [19] explain market dynamics
with lock-in, fashions or unstable renewal. They posit that it is dominated
by the behavioral rules of consumers reﬂecting preference for distinction or
conformity.
Cowan et al. and Janssen and Jager identify consumption norms as
an emergent property of systems of single agents interacting with others.
While we believe that social norms do indeed emerge from social interaction
of individuals, it is also the case that individuals act embedded in some
given social structure. Social norms for instance lead often to institutions,
which have a semi-permanent character, and change only slowly as norms
change. Individuals are also part of diﬀerent social groups whose members
show similar behavior against each other and members of other social groups.
We believe that these are factors that should not be neglected. Therefore,
instead of taking an agent based view, we pursue a population approach
and study adoption patterns and the speed of diﬀusion in relation to a given
social structure.
2.2 Consumption as a social activity: the relation to social
structure
Commodities do not only have an intrinsic value in use, they have also a
social meaning. Sociologists have long stressed that individuals value goods
because they deﬁne their social position in relation to associates in lower
or higher status positions. This comparison enters in the assessment of
their well-being (see Bourdieu [4]). In a similar line Amartya Sen [27, p.7]
has argued that commodities have functionings, which allow people to do
something or to be something. These functionings are diﬀerent from hav-
ing a good or from having utility. They depend on the evaluation of the
circumstances of life of a person, and are also determined through interper-
sonal comparison. This points to the fact that preferences of individuals are
interrelated.
An early example for the recognition of interrelatedness of preferences
was Duesenberry’s [11] analysis of the consumption patterns of households,
which led to the formulation of his relative income hypothesis. It states
that families reduce their savings in order to keep up with the standard
of living to which they have become accustomed in case their income falls.
For Easterlin [12] this corresponds to a model in which the well-being of
an individual varies with his or her income, but is inversely related to the
income of others. He shows in a series of papers that people do not feel
better oﬀ with increasing aﬄuence unless their relative position in regard
to other members of the society improves. One of the possible reasons
3for this is that when consumers interact and learn from each other they
do not only exchange information on the technical characteristics of the
products they own, but also on their social symbols or meanings, which are
the result of social interaction. These meanings are constituted by the way
in which people interact in distinct social contexts. Commodities and their
functionings aﬀect the perception people have about themselves and create
identity via social diﬀerentiation.
Veblen [35] has suggested that individuals compare themselves to sig-
niﬁcant others in terms of the status that comes with the wealth displayed
through consumption. The comparison of the achievements of a person and
the ones of its social reference group is a major force in creating desires and
aspiration. The command over commodities is a mean to these ends. In
a capitalistic society achieved money wealth is an important criterion for
social achievement, but as direct personal interactions are less common this
becomes obvious to others only through the consumption pattern of relevant
others. Accordingly the functionings a person is able to attain through the
acquisition and consumption of commodities act as important signalling de-
vices for status. The diﬀerences in achievable functionings are a source for
aspiration. As people desire to live up to “standards of decency” [35, p.88]
in a society that is hierarchically structured the social elites are obvious ex-
amples to follow. People thus tend to seek consumption patterns associated
with the lifestyles of higher income groups. As Frey and Stutzer [15, p. 411]
put it, “people look upward when making comparisons. Aspirations thus
tend to be above the level reached.”
The discussion so far shows that the consumption of commodities does
not only signal what people actually are, but also how they would like to
be considered. Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption is based on the
assumption that leading classes tend to seek distinction from other social
groups in order to show their status as social elite. As over time commodi-
ties lose their ability to confer status, members of these social group tend
to continuously acquire new consumption goods. They are the resources
with which the competition of individuals for the scarce resource “status”
takes place (Campbell [5, p.104]). In this way the material norms on which
judgements of well-being are based change continuously.
A possible reason for this is that the members of the leading groups of
society draw part of their identity and well-being from what they consume.
Nevertheless, over time the income of the lower social groups increases, and
they acquire the capability of imitating the social elite. As a consequence its
members will change their patterns of consumption in order to defend their
relative position of well-being. The dialectic tension between aspiration and
distinction gives rise to a never ending race, as commodities that at one
time may confer status loose their signiﬁcance once the other classes have
caught up. In this way tastes do “trickle down” from the higher classes
to lower social strata (see Trigg [34, p. 106]. This is a powerful engine of
4social and economic change. Its eﬀect will be more pronounced in an equal
society, where the chances of an individual to become a member of the upper
class are high. Under these circumstances it is more likely that lower class
individuals encounter upper class individuals and induce aspiration eﬀects.
There are diﬀerent forces at work within social groups that govern group
cohesion or rejection. Social norms establish behavioral regularities to which
the members of a group are supposed to adhere. As consumption is a sig-
nalling device for social status, it is naturally constrained by them as well.
Posner [23] deﬁnes social norms as a rule that is based on some socially
shared belief on how people ought to behave, but is not promulgated by
any oﬃcial or legal source. They are sometimes self-enforcing, sometimes
enforced by expressions of disapproval, ridicule, ostracism or codes of honor
and related actions. Social norms are a sort of behavioral public good, to
which every member should make a positive contribution. If that happens
the behavior is reciprocated while deviations from established patterns of
behavior are likely to be heavily punished (see e.g. Fehr and G¨ achter [13,
p.166]). These mechanisms determine the pressure toward uniformity in
groups. People cannot easily avoid them due to their inherited position in
social space, as repeated social interactions are socially localized. Accord-
ingly people tend to choose similar commodities than their peers, because
“joining the ’herd’ makes their choice act less assertive and perspicuous”
(Sen [28, p. 751]). Social norms determine the bandwidth within which
discrepancies in behavior are allowed, and hence the ease to break with the
closer social environment. An example in case is the medieval society with
its “God given” order discussed later. Any break with the social group as-
signed by birth was impossible and could happen only at the danger of being
marginalized by society. In more subtle ways such norms exist still today
and are a deﬁning moment of any society.
As Akerlof [1] has stressed interactions in a social group are not only
synergetic, but very often they are also conﬂictual. People tend to move out
of a group, which does not share their basic values, and the group in turn
supports their exit in order to maintain its inner cohesion (see Simon [30]).
Economic success or educational achievement may endow members of a so-
cial group with some upper-class power or attributes so that in their aspira-
tion to a higher standard of living they break with their social environment.
People who have already a high status in turn may feel the need to over-
come their inherited social past, as they resent the social eminence of their
peers and search for alternative means of expression. These forces give rise
to behavioral variety within groups, which consists of compliance with and
rejection of given lifestyles.
This discussion suggests that the social factors inﬂuencing the adoption
of a positional good may be condensed to eﬀects existing between members of
diﬀerent social classes, namely aspiration and distinction, and intra-group
eﬀects consisting of snobbism or individualistic behavior and conformism
5or bandwagon behavior. In the model that follows, we take into account
these two characteristics of the social structure in which an individual is
embedded to study their inﬂuence on the speed of market penetration of
the new commodity. These social characteristics are the engine driving
the dynamics in the model. As will be shown, diﬀerent constellations of
social coherence in the leading group and equality of opportunity give rise
to diﬀerent patterns of diﬀusion.
3 The model
We formalize the considerations put forward in the previous section as an
evolutionary game with two groups of individuals.1 As such our model is
concerned with the frequency evolution of consumption strategies in the
economic system. In this model the members of each population are het-
erogeneous. The perceived utility derived from consumption is based on
the individuals characteristics and the characteristics of the population as
a whole, i.e. the individuals in the game derive their utility of consumption
from the interaction with the members of their own groups, as well as from
the interaction with members of the other social group.
We derive the equilibria of the model analytically and establish their
local stability, but unlike most theoretical work in evolutionary games the
focus of our model does not lie on the investigation of the application of
the evolutionary stable strategy solution concept to the dynamic stability
of the replicator dynamic. We focus on the study of the adjustment process
towards a new equilibrium once a new commodity is introduced into the
economy. For this purpose we simulate the behavior of the model for some
limit scenarios and analyze the resulting diﬀusion patterns.
3.1 Players and Strategies
There are two social classes in our model. Each class i (i=1,2) is charac-
terized by an “average” available consumption budget per unit of time and
individual wi,w1 < w2, and its share in the total population qi,q1 > q2 with
q1+q2 = 1. Equality of opportunity is captured by these population shares.
The share of the lower class, q1 may be thought of as a measure of equality:
if q1 = 0.5 we have a perfectly equal class structure, as each agent has an
equal probability of being member in one of the two cohorts. Population
shares and available income (w1, w2, q1, q2) are exogenously given and are
assumed to be constant over time.
We assume that each unit of time an individual of a population chooses
a consumption basket consisting of two parts: a luxury good, and a basic
1See Taylor [33], as well as Cressman [10] and Weibull [36] and the classic references
cited there.
6good. The utility of consuming a basket is the sum of the utilities from
consuming its parts. In choosing a luxury good an individual has the choice
between two alternatives: good X with price px, or good Y with price py. We
assume that the endowment of each individual is large enough to consume
any of the two commodities, (wi > py,px); i = 1,2. The luxury goods
are indivisible. For simplicity we also assume that they have no other value
than a social one. In other words, individuals derive utility from owning the
good or not as this conveys social status, and not from its intrinsic value in
use. Consumption of the basic good has no particular social meaning, and
has decreasing marginal utility. The basic good is perfectly divisible. We
assume that prices reﬂect marginal costs, and that they do not change over
time.2
The share of the lower class consuming good X at time t is given by x1.
The remaining share of the population consuming good Y is y1 = 1 − x1.
Similarly, x2 and y2 = 1−x2 are the shares of the upper class of individuals
consuming X and Y , respectively. Thus, individuals in both classes play
pure strategies, where the strategies are denoted as ex when she chooses the
basket with good X, and ey when he goes for the basket with good Y . The
population states for the two classes are then deﬁned by s1=(x1, y1) for the
lower class, and by s2=(x2, y2) for the upper class.
3.2 Payoﬀs
Goods with social meaning Capturing some of the considerations ad-
vanced in the previous section, we assume that consumption of goods X
and Y is driven purely by social factors. We analyze two important behav-
ioral motives described before: aspiration and distinction. The lower class
aspires to the standards of decency demonstrated by the upper class, the
social elite. Members of this group would like to signal status similar to
that of the upper class. In terms of our model this means that they want
to buy what the upper class buys. On the other hand the upper class seeks
distinction to preserve their status as social elite.
As for the behavior within the two social groups we will examine a spec-
trum of diﬀerent “social norms” ranging from a society forcing strict behav-
ioral compliance on their members, to a “non-conformist” society, where it
is important for any individual to emphasize his own identity and individ-
uality from the others. In a conformist society mechanisms of retaliation
will sanction deviant behavior. Conversely in a “non-conformist” society
individuals “aping” others will be perceived as a nuisance and accordingly
retaliatory mechanisms will ensure that this does not happen too frequently.
We assume that an individual is engaged into two contests per unit of
time against a randomly drawn opponent from the total population. The
2This is done for analytical clarity. The results do not change if we assume falling
prices (due to scale or learning economies) for the new good.
7utility given by a speciﬁc consumption proﬁle depends on his expected payoﬀ
in this matching. We choose the following speciﬁcation of the payoﬀ matrix
to formalize the “distinction”-eﬀect.
ex ey
ex, (basket with good X) -1 1
ey, (basket with good Y ) 1 -1
Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix D (distinction)
An agent perceives a positive utility whenever his choice is diﬀerent
from his opponent’s choice, and nuisance (of the same magnitude) when the
choices coincide. In the same way, matrix C enables us to capture conformist
behavior. Here, conversely as in the case of “distinction” behavior, an agent
gets positive payoﬀ if he chooses the same basket as his opponent, and
negative outcome otherwise.
ex ey
ex, (basket with good X) 1 -1
ey, (basket with good Y ) -1 1
Table 2: Payoﬀ matrix C (conformity)
Basic good Consumption of the basic good has no particular social mean-
ing and does not depend on the choice of the others. Every part of income
that is not spent on the luxury is spent on these “basics”. The marginal
utility of consuming w −p of the basic good is decreasing, i.e. the utility of
the income not spent on the luxury falls on the margin for higher incomes.
To capture this standard assumption we use - without loss of generality - a
concave function given by
√
w − p.
A basket An individual consuming a basket that contains basic and lux-
ury goods gets a payoﬀ which is given by the sum of the utility from the
consumption of the basic good and the expected payoﬀ from consuming a
luxury good with social meaning. For an agent out of the low income group
playing strategy ek, k = x,y the expected payoﬀ is given by
u1(ek;s1,s2) = q1
h






+ ek · w1, (1)








8with i = 1,2. The ﬁrst term in equation (1) describes interactions within
the lower class. Here the parameter ω ∈ [0,1] captures the “social norms” in
place in a society. We assume that ω = 0 for a perfectly “non-conformist”
set-up, while ω = 1 in the case of strictly conservative social norms. All the
values within these limits represent the more realistic intermediate cases,
expressing a tendency to conformity if ω > 1/2 or to individualism if ω <
1/2. A special case worth mentioning is where ω = 1/2. Here the intergroup
heterogeneity of each population vanishes and the game transforms into a
contest between two homogeneous populations. The second term in equation
(1) arises from the aspiration eﬀects present in the social class, and, ﬁnally
the third term is just the utility derived from consumption of the basic good.










+ s1 · w1. (2)
The utility of individuals of the upper class is derived in a similar fashion.
In analogy to equation (1) equation (3) deﬁnes the pay oﬀ for an individual







ek · (ωC + (1 − ω)D)s2
i
+ ek · w2. (3)







s2 · (ωC + (1 − ω)D)s2
i
+ s2 · w2. (4)
The second and third terms of equation (3) are similar to the ones in equation
(1) for the lower class. The diﬀerence is the ﬁrst term, which captures the
wish of the upper class to distinguish themselves from members of the lower
class.
3.3 Replicator Dynamics
We use the standard two-population replicator dynamics introduced by Tay-
lor [33] to analyze our model. The dynamics is deﬁned by the system of four
diﬀerential equations









with initial conditions xi(0) = 1 − ε, yi(0) = ε, i=1,2. In the appendix
to this paper we examine the local stability of the replicator dynamics for
the equilibria towards which the model converges under diﬀerent parameter
settings. The model is not stable in a small domain of the parameter space,
as shown in ﬁgure 1. This is discussed in detail later.
93.4 Equilibria of the model
There are four types of possible equilibria in the model: two in pure strate-
gies (pooling and separating), one in mixed strategies, and one where the
upper class plays pure (consuming the new good), while the lower class plays
mixed strategies. In what follows this is denoted as partially mixed strat-
egy. Furthermore we determine under which parameter values for equality
of opportunity (q1 > 0.5) and social norms (ω) a given equilibrium ex-
ists and is locally stable in the replicator dynamics (5). In the appendix
we show that they are (locally) stable. For all parameters other than
qi and ω we use the same values as we employ for our simulations, i.e.
w1 = 1,w2 = 2,px = 0.5,py = 1.
3.4.1 Pooling (no penetration) equilibrium: y1 = 0, y2 = 0.
This is an equilibrium where there is no diﬀusion of the new good at all.
The equilibrium requires
∆u1(0,0) < 0, and ∆u2(0,0) < 0.
where ∆ui = ui(ey;s1,s2) − ui(ex;s1,s2), i = 1,2 represent gains or losses
in utility for each of the classes from consuming the new or the old good.
According to (1) and (3) ∆ui(y1,y2) is then deﬁned as
∆u1(y1,y2) = 4αq1y1 + 4q2y2 − ∆w1 − 2αq1 − 2q2,
∆u2(y1,y2) = −4q1y1 + 4αq2y2 − ∆w2 + 2q1 − 2αq2, (6)
where α ≡ 2ω − 1 and ∆wi ≡
√
wi − px −
√
wi − py > 0. Substituting
expressions for ∆ui from (6) we get
q1(1 − α) < 1 +
∆w1
2




When these inequalities hold, there is no diﬀusion. Accordingly, the share
of the new good in equilibrium will be zero,
Y ∗ = 0. (8)
3.4.2 Separating equilibrium: y1 = 0, y2 = 1.
In separating equilibrium only the upper class adopts the new good, while
the lower class uses the old one. The conditions for the equilibrium are
∆u1(0,1) < 0, and ∆u2(0,1) > 0.
or by substituting as before
q1(1 + α) > 1 −
∆w1
2
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given by
Y ∗ ≡ q1y1 + q2y2 = q2. (10)
3.4.3 Partially mixed equilibrium: 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1, y2 = 1.
The third possible equilibrium is a partially mixed equilibrium, where the
upper class uses only the new good, while the lower class uses both. The
conditions for the equilibrium are
∆u1(y∗
1,1) = 0, and ∆u2(y∗
1,1) > 0. (11)
Accordingly, from the ﬁrst equation in (11) we can ﬁnd the equilibrium









for α 6= 0. (12)
The equilibrium market share for the upper class if condition (11) is to hold,
is y∗
2 = q2. From this together with (12) the market share of the new good
in equilibrium is given by
Y ∗ = q1y∗






for α 6= 0 (13)
To determine the domain of q1 and ω, where the equilibrium exists we sub-
stitute y∗
1 into inequality (11), and in addition we require 0 < y∗
1 < 1. It
gives us












for α > 0 (α < 0).
3.4.4 Equilibrium in mixed strategies: 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1.
Finally, there is an equilibrium in the model, where individuals from both
classes use the old and the new good. It must hold that u1x = u1y and
u1x = u1y. This implies that the following conditions hold,
∆u1(y∗
1,y∗
2) = 0, and ∆u2(y∗
1,y∗
2) = 0.

















Therefore the market share of the new good is






(1 + α)∆w1 − (1 − α)∆w2
4(1 + α2)
(15)
The solutions of the system must be in the range (0,1). From this follows
















3.4.5 Domains of the equilibrium and stability
The domain of the parameters for social norms and equality of opportunity
(ω,q1) (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 1) for which the diﬀerent equilibria exist and
are locally stable can be divided into ﬁve parts by inequalities (7), (9), (14),
(16) and the stability conditions given in the appendix. This is depicted in
the ﬁgure 1.
( Figure 1 about here.)
For combinations (ω,q1) enclosed by area 4 only mixed equilibria exist
and are stable. For an increase in inequality we move to area 3, where
the new good Y is consumed by all individuals from the upper class, and
by some individuals of the lower class. Here we observe partially mixed
equilibria. If the social norms change towards conformism, we step into the
domain with separating equilibria 2, which are stable all over 2. The no
penetration (pooling) equilibrium domain 1 is located in the bottom-right
corner of ﬁgure 1. In 1 both no penetration and separating equilibrium
exist and are stable, therefore the replicator dynamics (5) may converge to
any of them depending on the initial conditions. For the initial conditions
used in our model we observe convergence to the pooling equilibrium. A
mixed strategy equilibrium exists for the parameter values enclosed by area
5, however it is not stable and shows limit cycles oscillating between on
12the boundary (i.e. Y ∗ = 0 and Y ∗ = 1). The reason for this is that at
ω = 0.5 the intra-group eﬀect of the game vanishes and becomes a game
between homogeneous populations. A glance at matrices C and D shows
that matching strategies are of opposite sign. Thus, independent of the
consumption strategy a member of the distinction group chooses a-priori
she has always an incentive to switch to the alternative strategy if she is
matched with a member of the conformist group playing the same strategy.
For these solutions an analysis of the diﬀusion patterns is not meaningful.
3.5 Analysis of the diﬀusion paths for some limit cases
We use our model for the analysis of the role of equality of opportunity
and social norms in the process of diﬀusion of a new good. We start with
simulations over some limit cases capturing perfect conformity ω = 1 and
total non-conformity ω = 0, as well as set-ups for a society with perfectly
equal opportunity and with strongly unequal opportunity, i.e. for parameter
values q1 = 0.5 and q1 = 0.9 respectively. We assume that the consumption
prior to a date t = 0 is limited to only one basket with good X. At that
moment in time a new product Y is introduced with an initial market share
ε (for both classes). The price of the new product, py, is higher than the
price of the old one, px. We examine the model for px = 0.5,py = 1 and
consumption budgets w1 = 1,w2 = 2,. The initial market share of Y for
both social groups is set to ε = 0.01.
We use standard measures to describe the diﬀusion paths resulting from
our simulations. Technological forecasters commonly characterize the diﬀu-
sion speed of new commodities as the length of the time interval elapsing
between the diﬀusion path reaching 10% and 90% of the ﬁnal saturation
level of the commodity. This measure is denoted as ∆t := t90% − t10%. As
∆t ignores the time interval elapsing between the initial introduction of the
commodity and it reaching 10% of the ﬁnal equilibrium market share, we
will use the t10% measure separately to capture the time it takes a commod-
ity to take oﬀ and penetrate the market. The results from these calculations
together with the absolute saturation levels is depicted in ﬁgure 3. In our
discussion we ignore the ∆t measure, as it is very similar for all runs and
does not add much information. Alternatively, we use the Fisher-Pry sub-
stitution rate [14], which captures the speed at which an old commodity




= exp(a + bt).
In its linear transform ln(
y
1−y) the slope b of a ﬁtted straight line captures the
learning or substitution speed, while the intercept a measures the adoption
delay. The steeper this line is, the faster substitution takes place, the larger
the intercept (in absolute terms), the higher is the adoption delay. The
13Fisher-Pry substitution rate is depicted in ﬁgure 4, while the intercepts and
slopes of ﬁtted curves are presented in ﬁgure 5.
3.5.1 Eﬀect of inequality
We ﬁrst examine two polar cases of social norms and analyze how changing
equality of opportunity inﬂuences the diﬀusion pattern of the new consumer
good introduced at time t = 0. The paths our model generates for these
constellations are shown in the upper quadrants of ﬁgure 2.
( Figure 2 about here.)
Conservative social norms, ω = 1 Under perfect conformity the intra-
class distinction eﬀect is not present, i.e. the D matrices in the terms cap-
turing inner-group interaction in our equations (1) and (3) disappear. In this
case people of the same social class who are randomly matched play a coor-
dination game given by pay-oﬀ matrix C. The top left quadrant of ﬁgure 2
shows the diﬀusion curves resulting for a parameter range 0.5 ≤ q1 ≤ 0.95.
The eﬀect of growing equality is twofold: on one hand it speeds up diﬀusion,
and on the other hand, the level of saturation falls.
With the given initial conditions at q1 = q2 the members of the lower
class derive the same expected utility from being equal to their peers as well
as from being equal to the upper class. There is no incentive for members of
the lower class to switch to the new commodity, as given the initial market
shares of the new commodity in the two groups, utility is already almost at
its maximum. We observe at ﬁrst a pooling equilibrium given by equation
(8). The few initial adopters will switch back to the old luxury due to
existing peer pressure.
A change in equality has the eﬀect on the upper class to increase disutility
from being equal than the lower class. It starts paying upper class individu-
als to adopt the new good. The model settles on separating equilibria given
by equation (10). Due to the pressure towards conformity adoption is very
slow. Diﬀusion takes longest under near-equality conditions (see ﬁgure 2),
but eventually the whole upper class will adopt the new commodity.
Non-conformist society, ω = 0 The top right quadrant of ﬁgure 2 indi-
cates that the diﬀusion paths resulting in a non-conformist society are quite
diﬀerent. In a perfectly non-conformist social constellation the matrix C
capturing intra-group interaction in equations (1) and (3) vanishes. In this
case people of the same social class who are randomly matched play a “hawk-
dove” game given by pay-oﬀ matrix D. Each individual seeks to be diﬀerent
from its peers. This means that over the parameter range of q1 up to the
value of q1 = 0.9 the model settles on a mixed strategy equilibrium given by
equation (15) for both social classes, and to a partially mixed equilibrium
14as in equation (13) at that value and beyond. This implies that under the
“individualistic” setting of this run the equilibrium reﬂects an economy with
maximum variety on the market for most equality of opportunity param-
eters. With ﬁxed ω the market share for the new good gravitates around
0.45, and falls in the partially mixed equilibrium range.
The inter-group eﬀects are responsible for short fashion waves visible as
an overshooting over the ﬁnal saturation level. As the frequency of adopters
of the new good in the lower class increases, the upper class starts perceiving
disutility from buying it, while utility for the lower class increases, so that
there is an incentive to adopt more of it. This triggers some members of the
upper class to revert to the old commodity. With the frequency of adopters
of the new good in the upper class decreasing, utility of the new good falls
for individuals of the lower class as well and the model settles on the mixed
equilibrium. When the opportunity parameter is changed towards values
capturing inequality, the upper class will restrict consumption of Y earlier
as lower class members are encountered at higher frequency, thus causing the
overshooting to appear earlier. Rising inequality has the eﬀect to dampen
out fashion waves as the parameter range for partially mixed equilibria is
approached.
3.5.2 Eﬀect of conformity
While in the ﬁrst set of runs we examined the diﬀusion path along the ver-
tical parameter axis in ﬁgure 1, we now change parameters to move along
its horizontal parameter axis, examining how changes in social norms in-
ﬂuence the process of diﬀusion for any given equality of opportunity. The
diﬀusion curves are shown in the quadrants at the bottom of ﬁgure 2. The
diﬀusion paths resulting from these model runs are hybrids of the ﬁrst two
cases studied so far.
Inequality, q1 = 0.9 In this case we observe partially mixed Nash equi-
libria and separating equilibria, as the parameter for conformity is changed
from 0 to 1. At low conformism players in both populations would tend
to use both goods, but as inequality is high and the probability for upper
class types to encounter similar lower class types is high, it pays them to
play a pure strategy, even though it may cause disutility in playing against
peers. The shift of ω towards conformity leads to a fall in the adoption of
the new good in the lower class as the utility of individuals being equal to
their peers starts outweighing snobbism and aspiration eﬀects. The satura-
tion level shifts downwards and the speed of diﬀusion decreases. The upper
class on the other hand continues to have an incentive to adopt the new
commodity due to the high frequency of members of the lower class in the
total population. The market share drops to the share of the upper class.
15Equality, q1 = 0.5 In changing the parameter ω over its parameter range,
the model settles on four possible equilibria. Under non-conformity we ob-
serve mixed strategy equilibria, in the parameter range of 0.5 ≤ ω < 0.6
the model exhibits a cyclical behavior, beyond that separating equilibria
and close to perfect conformism there is a pooling equilibrium. Whether
the model settles on the latter depends on the initial conditions chosen, and
this is the case for the parameter value for  we use.
Fashion cycles emerge as the intra-group eﬀects vanish. Members of the
lower class start deriving more utility from being equal to members of the
upper class, while the latter’s disutility increases through this development.
In approaching the critical value dampened cycles appear, which converge
to a stable saturation level after some time. At ω = 0.5 nevertheless, intra-
group eﬀects completely vanish and fast cycles emerge. The upper class
has a continued incentive to change its consumption pattern, as the lower
class catches up. Only after conformity becomes stronger it pays better for
members of the lower social class to stick on the same consumption pattern
as their peers and forgo utility from imitating the upper classes.
3.5.3 Market penetration time and diﬀusion speed
Figure 3 shows in the top row the market share achieved under the four
diﬀerent scenarios. The graphs in the second row instead display the market
penetration time t10% for each run. The diﬀusion time ∆t is not reported
as it appears to be similar for most scenarios. A better measure for the
diﬀusion speed are the Fisher-Pry substitution rates and the parameters of
ﬁtted substitution curves, which are reported in ﬁgures 4 and 5.
( Figure 3 about here.)
Figure 3 reveals that the ﬁnal market shares are highest for the runs
simulating non-conformity and equal populations, while they are lowest for
the conformist scenarios. Equilibria in mixed and partially mixed strate-
gies tend to settle on higher market shares than separating equilibria. The
market penetration times are in general slowest under conformist set-ups.
( Figure 4 about here.)
The analysis of the Fisher-Pry substitution rates gives a clearer picture.
Figure 4 shows (see top-left quadrant) that the substitution rate is highest
under inequality with perfect conformism, while the picture is reversed under
non-conformism, as displayed in the subplot in the top-right quadrant. The
two subplots in the lower half of ﬁgure 4 show that non-conformism in general
leads to faster adoption than conformism. If substitution curves are ﬁtted to
the substitution rates displayed in ﬁgure 4, then the picture becomes even
more telling.
16( Figure 5 about here.)
The right part of ﬁgure 5 shows the intercept values and slope of the ﬁtted
linear substitution curves for the runs with changing equality. They reﬂect
the adoption delay and substitution speed. The ﬁrst is clearly higher for
conformism than for non-conformism and tends to increase with increasing
inequality, while the latter is faster under conformism and is falling with
increasing inequality. Over the parameter range of ω instead the adoption
delay is practically equal for parameter values capturing non-conformism,
but while it levels the out in the equality scenario, it increases steadily in
the inequality scenario. This picture is reversed for the substitution speed.
In the part of the parameter space where the adoption delays are equal for
the equality and inequality scenarios, it is faster for the equality scenario
but falling as parameters are set to capture conformism.
These results are summarized in table 3. The market penetration and
diﬀusion time is slowest under a conformist setting with equality. A social
set up with conformism and inequality fares better. These two set-ups in
turn are dominated by non-conformist ones. The sign between the non-
conformist setting with equality and the one with inequality is ambiguous
in terms of the adoption delay or the t10% measure, but under the ﬁrst the
substitution speed is clearly faster. Hence we say that the social set-up with





Table 3: Summary of the results
4 Social norms and the rise of consumerism: a
reasoned history
The sustained growth in the 19th and 20th century is normally associated
with the adoption and diﬀusion of path-breaking technologies, such as the
steam engine, or the railways and a myriad of other minor yet signiﬁ-
cant, productivity increasing innovations. The increasing wealth generated
through them induced consumerist interest. Historians have related the rise
of consumerism in the late 18th, 19th and 20th century to conspicuous con-
sumption (see e.g. McKendrick [21]). Technological improvement was thus
accompanied by an increasing willingness of consumers to absorb novelty,
which opened up new markets and fostered growth even further. The his-
torical record shows that such a relationship existed well before modern
17times. Aristocracies tended to deﬁne their class lines through the consump-
tion of luxury goods and by fancying extensive mansions. As the group of
merchants grew in size and wealth, they tended to imitate their lifestyles,
yet consumerism and high class status were not automatic companions (see
Stearns [29]). The causes were twofold. First, before modern times new
products were not continuously generated, so that there was a limitation
in terms to conspicuous behavior in consumption. The second and in rela-
tion to our model more important reason is that social norms built around
traditional values and religious interest limited consumerism even when the
means were available.
Our results summarized in table 3 suggest that social norms can play
an inhibiting role, if they do not allow for too much behavioral variety in
the social classes. These social norms have normally emerged and stabilized
over time. Certainly the most important and most inﬂuential ones in re-
lation to consumption were those associated with religion. The pervasive
value systems established around major religions urged their members to
seek spiritual goals and to be suspicious of material ones. This holds true
for Buddhism, Christianity or Islam. The display of riches and success was
thus inappropriate in terms of religious norms. A telling example is Christ’s
statement that it would be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a
needle than for a rich man to gain entry to heaven. This maxim was conve-
niently used by the leading classes to cement the given social order. They
used religion to induce lower classes too stick to their “God given” position
in society and thus not to deviate in their consumption from that of their
social class. As the rules they set were disguised as God’s will, they could
easily develop into a social norm, which was no longer perceived as imposed
from outside, but as a matter of decency. Considering the importance of reli-
gious belief such norms constrained consumer behavior not only in medieval
times, but were actually present also during the ﬁrst and second industrial
revolution. Stearns [29, p.52-3] reports Protestant ministers in the United
States to have rallied as late as 1853 against the parade of luxury and de-
manding from lower class believers to aspire to more durable riches than
that oﬀered by the material world. Such reservations were often related to
the fact that conspicuous consumption blurred class lines. In complaining
about deteriorating popular moral middle- and upper-class observers and
their ministers pointed to the fact that it was increasingly diﬃcult to tell a
person’s status from the dress. This was of course not completely true, as the
diﬀerences in quality remained remarkable. But the increasing importance
of urban life caused a shift in mainstream Protestantism. Consumer goods
were now considered to be God’s gifts to mankind. Our model suggests that
the relaxation of such norms would ease the diﬀusion of new goods, as it
indeed did.
The reasons for the increase in behavioral variety in the diﬀerent social
classes in history were manifold, and their discussion will also shed some light
18on the relation between equality of opportunity and social norms, which in
our model were assumed to be exogenous. The historical record suggests
that commercialization setting in with the age of Enlightenment was a ma-
jor driving force in disrupting strict social norms inhibiting consumption.
The new rationality in science led to the development of new productiv-
ity enhancing tools and machines, which increased wealth. Besides the old
aristocracy new wealthy merchant classes emerged. This rise in equality
was accompanied by a quest for a similar lifestyle as the established classes.
The merchants resented aristocratic eminence and tried to challenge their
social status. In turn during the period of the First and Second Industrial
Revolution many traditional lifestyles and the associated social status were
disrupted. The urbanization and the rapid population growth furthered the
process of status change. Consumption increasingly gained importance in
order to demonstrate social achievement. Commodities served as badges of
identity in such a rapidly changing social climate (see Stearns [29, p. 27-
32]). This was even more the case as in the late 19th century workers started
started their quest for higher wages. The importance of work changed from
being a goal in itself. More and more people considered it an instrument for
other gains and this translated into consumerist interest (ibid. p. 56). This
summary discussion suggests that an increase in wealth and an increasingly
equal equality of opportunity disrupted social conventions that exerted an
inhibiting inﬂuence on behavioral variety in consumption. A more accurate
enquiry into the precise relationship between the two factors is an issue for
further research, but imitation and conspicuous consumption seem to have
gained increasing importance over time. Our model is able to account for
all these factors reasonably well.
The model allows to engage into an exercise of periodizing economic his-
tory over the last two centuries in Europe and the United States. The social
conventions over this period have developed in such a way that in terms of
table 3 a gradual move from the north-eastern to the south-western quadrant
took place. The north-eastern quadrant captures the social set-up of antique
or medieval societies, with their strict adherence to a given social order and
an accentuated inequality. In the aftermath of the period of Enlighten-
ment wealth shifted increasingly away from the land-owning aristocracy to
merchants. Inequality decreased, but remained high. This historical devel-
opment nevertheless disrupted the given social order enshrined in the guild
system and increased non-conformity in the society. This happened ﬁrst in
the upper class where rich merchants competed in innovating new lifestyles
to show their position in society. The two Industrial Revolutions increased
freedom of choice also in the lower social classes, and the rise of democratic
institutions, the rise of public schools as well as the increasing activity of in-
dustrial action through trade unions supported the development of equality
of opportunity. This is the set-up of the south-western quadrant, which, as
our results show, dominates all other social set-ups. This underscores again
19the main result of the paper.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a simple model of conspicuous consumption to study
the inﬂuence of parameters reﬂecting social structure on the diﬀusion paths
of product innovations of consumer goods. We used the set-up of an evolu-
tionary multi-population model with two populations. The ﬁrst population
is the upper class, whose members act as innovating force in consumption.
The second population is the lower class, which imitates the consumption
behavior of the higher class. We assumed that in both classes there are
social norms exerting pressure on their members not to innovate or imitate,
i.e. to develop an “individualistic” consumption behavior. We explored the
inﬂuence of changes in equality of opportunity between the two classes, as
well as the eﬀect of social norms on the speed of diﬀusion of new products
their take-oﬀ time and the market saturation level. The main ﬁnding of the
paper is that novelty diﬀuses most rapidly in a social setting where equality
of opportunity is equal and behavioral variety is high. This social set-up
dominates all other constellations. In other words, societies allowing for
more behavioral variety and ensuring equal equality of opportunity should
experience a more dynamic consumer behavior than otherwise. Our model
has potentially a wide range of implications, and could be extended in var-
ious directions. Furthermore we oﬀered a theoretical interpretation of the
historical record on the rise of consumerism. We found that our model was
able to capture this development reasonably well.
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22A Local stability of the equilibria of the model
Each Nash-equilibrium of our model gives the saturation level the new positional
good will reach for a speciﬁc parameter constellation after having been introduced
in the economy. To investigate their stability we rewrite the replicator dynamics
(5) as
˙ y1 = y1(1 − y1)∆u1,
˙ y2 = y2(1 − y2)∆u2, (17)
where the ∆ui is deﬁned as in equation (6).
A.1 Pooling (no penetration) equilibrium: y1 = 0, y2 = 0.
To check if this equilibrium is (locally) stable we examine the Jacobian of the
replicator dynamics (17) at y∗








Since ∆ui(0,0) < 0, i = 1,2 the determinant of the Jacobian is positive, detJ(0,0) >
0, while the trace is negative, tr J(0,0) < 0. Thus, we can conclude that for all
values of q1 and ω for which this equilibrium exists it is a stable stationary point
of the system (17).
A.2 Separating equilibrium: y1 = 0, y2 = 1.
At y∗
1 = 0, y∗







The determinant is positive for all q1 and ω. The sign of the trace is
sign(tr J) = sign(∆u1(0,1) − ∆u1(0,2)) =
sign(2(1 − α) − 4q1 − (∆w1 − ∆w2).
For the parameters (wi, pi) we have chosen, once the condition for this equilibrium
(9) hold, the sign of the trace is negative. In combination with the positive deter-
23minant it implies that the equilibrium is stable for all values of parameters q1 and
ω satisfying (9).
A.3 Partially mixed equilibrium: 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1, y2 = 1.













The sign of the determinant is determined by the sign of α:
sign(detJ)) = −sign(α).
Sign of the trace of the Jacobian is
sign(tr J) = sign(4αq1y∗
1(1 − y∗
1) + 4q1y∗
1 − 2αq2 + ∆w2 − 2q1).
For q1 and ω satisfying (14) the trace of the Jacobian for ω < 0.5 (α < 0) is negative,
while for ω > 0.5 (α > 0) it is positive. Taking into account that tr (J)2 > 4det(J)
we can conclude that the equilibrium is a stable node of the replicator dynamics (17)
if ω < 0.5, For ω > 0.5 the equilibrium is a saddle point of the replicator dynamics,
and therefore it would depend on the initial conditions whether the system would
move towards the equilibrium or away from it.
A.4 Equilibrium in mixed strategies: 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1.
























2)(1 + α2) > 0,





Thus, equilibrium in the mixed strategies is stable for ω < 0.5 (α < 0) and unstable
for ω < 0.5 (α < 0).
24Figure 1: Domains of the stable equilibria of the model. (1) Pooling (no-
penetration) equilibrium (y1 = 0, y2 = 0), (2) separating equilibrium (y1 =
0, y2 = 1), (3) partially mixed strategy equilibrium (0 ≤ y1 ≤ 1, y2 = 1),
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Figure 2: Diﬀusion paths, examples of limit cases. Upper left quadrant:
perfect conformity, a change in class structure (towards inequality) shifts
the saturation level down and decreases absolute adoption time. Upper
right quadrant: non-conformity, changes in class structure speed up diﬀu-
sion (outer curves are for more equal values), saturation level is the same
for all set-ups. Inequality causes the overshooting to happen earlier and
ﬂattens it out for high inequality. Lower left quadrant: unequal class struc-
ture, changes in conformity shift the equilibrium up and accelerate absolute
diﬀusion time. Lower right quadrant: equality, changes in social norms ac-
celerate absolute diﬀusion time, ﬁnal market shares are in a close bond, some
solutions with ω ≈ 0.5 give rise to oscillations (fashion cycles).
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Figure 3: Diﬀusion statistics: results from the analysis of the limit cases.
N: non-conformity, C: conformity, E: equality; I: inequality.
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Figure 4: Fisher-Pry substitution rates: steeper slopes indicate faster adop-
tion. The arrows indicate the direction of change of the parameters.
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Figure 5: Parameters of ﬁtted Fisher-Pry substitution curves:
ln(
y
1−y) = a + bt. The intercept a captures the adoption delay, while
the parameter b captures the learning or substitution speed.
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